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abstract
We construct an endogenous growth model with new Keynesian-
type sticky prices and wages. In this model, monetary policy a®ects
long-run output growth. We characterize the optimal operational
monetary policy rule in this economy. We ¯nd that even though stabi-
lization of output growth increases long-run output growth, the opti-
mal monetary policy rule is the rule that makes interest rate respond
to price and wage actively and output growth mutely, similar as in
exogenous growth models. We also ¯nd that the optimal monetary
policy rule virtually maximizes mean growth. These results suggest
that although long-run growth is important for welfare, new Keyne-
sian's claim that monetary policy should stabilize nominal variables
is highly robust.
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1 Introduction
Our aim in this paper is to give some answers to the following questions.
How much does monetary policy a®ect long-run growth? Does the long-run
growth e®ect change the features of the optimal monetary stabilization policy
rule? In order to highlight the growth and welfare e®ect of monetary policy,
we incorporate Calvo (1983)-type sticky prices and wages to the two-capital
convex model of endogenous growth. We here consider two types of growth
e®ects, that is, the growth e®ect caused by the changes of long-run target
rate of in°ation under the deterministic environment and the e®ect arisen
from uncertainty and monetary stabilization policy rules such as the Taylor
rule. We shall call the former the deterministic growth e®ect and the latter
the stochastic growth e®ect. Our motivations and ¯ndings of this research
are as follows.
We ¯rst explain the deterministic growth e®ect. Empirical studies using
cross-country data claim that long-run growth and in°ation have a negative
relationship. Calibrating the model, we ¯nd that in steady state, price sticki-
ness cause negative long-run relationship between growth and in°ation under
positive in°ation rate and that the magnitude of this relationship strongly
depends on the degree of price stickiness. In the existence of price stickiness,
non-zero in°ation is a source of distortion which comes from price dispersion
This distortion reduces resources which can be used for investment and so
decreases output growth. This ¯nding suggests that the various strength of
price stickiness account for the di®erence of the relationship across countries.
Second, for the stochastic growth e®ect, Jones et al. (2005b) show that
this type of model has the e®ect of uncertainty on long-run growth. Incor-
porating nominal rigidities into their model can cause changes of long-run
growth rate through changes of interest rate policy rules. Moreover, It is
also known that this class of model improves over simple (exogenous growth)
RBC models.1 Hence, the endogenous growth models with nominal rigidi-
ties has the potential abilities accounting the business cycle properties better
than existing New Keynesian models. The relationship between °uctuations
and growth is also important from normative perspective. In his seminal
work, Lucas (1987) shows that the cost of business cycles is much less than
that of growth. It is well known that his claim is strongly robust,2 but it
does not imply that °uctuations are negligible for the macroeconomics at all,
because even if °uctuations itself has the small welfare e®ect, °uctuations
can a®ect the long-run growth through the optimization of the economic
1See Jones et al. (2005a). Comin and Gertler (2006) also show that other endogenous
growth model accounts for the medium term properties of business cycles well.
2The excellent surbeys in the literature are Lucas (2003) and Barlevy (2004a).
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agents(Barlevy, 2004b).
For these reasons, endogenizing productivity growth can be thought to
be important for the analysis of business cycle and stabilization policy. Most
of studies about short-run monetary policy (New Keynesian approach), how-
ever, have been ignored the e®ect of monetary policy on long-run economic
growth. We conjecture that the reason is purely technical issue. In most
of New Keynesian studies, they approximate to the policy functions around
non-stochastic steady-state up to ¯rst-order. In linear models, unconditional
mean of endogenous variables are idendical to the non-stochastic steady-state
value. Hence, even if long-run growth rate is endogenous, higher-order ap-
proximation is needed for the model to show the growth e®ect. We apply the
numerical computation method which approximating to the policy function
up to second-order developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). Their nu-
merical method enables us to address the relationship between stabilization
policy and long-run growth because endogenous growth models with nominal
rigidities approximated up to second-order do not hold certainty equivalence
so that long-run growth rate is no longer identical to non-stochastic steady-
state growth rate.
Solving our model by second-order approximation, we obtain some ¯nd-
ings about the stochastic growth e®ect and about the optimal operational
monetary policy as follows. First, in our model with stochastic disturbances,
the long-run rate of output growth is a®ected by the monetary stabiliza-
tion policy rules, especially policy rule responding to output though, under
simple Taylor rule, deviation of annual growth rate from deterministic bal-
anced growth path is very small, about ¡10¡3 percent. Second, The e®ect
of volatility of in°ation on long-run growth is not clear because of existence
of wage stickiness. We think it as a reason why empirical evidence about
the correlation between in°ation volatility and growth is unclear. Third,
we characterize the optimal operational monetary policy rules and ¯nd that
the features of the optimal operational policy is not turned from exogenous
growth New Keynesian models. This result implies that the growth e®ect of
Barlevy (2004b) which is caused by investment adjustment costs and nominal
rigidities do not have a strong tradeo®. Finally, We ¯nd the optimal oper-
ational monetary policy rule is virtually identical to the growth-maximizing
operational monetary policy rule in the sense that the growth-maximizing
policy rule attains virtually the same levels of walfare and growth rate as
the optimal policy rule. This ¯nding suggests that the monetary authorities
can virtually optimal allocation under price- and wage-stickiness only by re-
solving the tradeo® between price- and wage- stabilization even if monetary
policy a®ects long-run growth. This result is also consistent with Blackburn
and Pelloni (2005). As long as we know, it is the unique study about the
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relationship between the optimal monetary stabilization policy and long-run
growth. They show analytically that optimal monetary policy is identical
to the growth-maximizing policy in the endogenous growth model with neo-
classical-type nominal wage rigidity.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model into which stochastic endogenous growth and nominal rigidities are
fused, and calibrate the model. Section 3 analyzes the steady state and shows
some results about the deterministic growth e®ect. Section 4 consider the
stochastic growth and welfare e®ect under versions of Taylor rule. Section
5 considers the optimal operational interest-rate feedback rule. Section 6
concludes this paper.
2 The model
The model is a two-capital convex model of endogenous growth by Jones
et al. (2005a) incorporating Calvo-type sticky prices and wages, physical and
human capital investment adjustment costs, and habit persistence.
2.1 Households
The representative families, across whose menbers consumption and hour
worked are identical, have preferences which are described by the following
utility function,
E0
1X
t=0
¯tU(Ct ¡ bCt¡1; 1¡ nt);
with
U(Ct ¡ bCt¡1; 1¡ nt) ´
(
(Ct¡bCt¡1)1¡¾(1¡nt)Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾ when ¾ 6= 1
log(Ct ¡ bCt¡1) + Ã log(1¡ nt) when ¾ = 1;
where Et is the standard expectations operator conditional on information
at time t, Ct denotes per capita consumption, nt represents per capita labor
supply, ¯; b, and ¾ are a subjective discount factor, the habit formation
parameter, and the curvature parameter of utility, respectively. Households
can consume the single ¯nal good, and the ¯nal good also can be used for
human and physical capital investment. The ¯nal good is a composite good
made of a continuum of de®erenciated goods Yit indexed by i 2 [0; 1], by
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Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Hence the demand for Yit is given by
Yit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶¡µ
Yt;
Yt = Ct + I
K
t + I
H
t (1)
and price index Pt is
Pt =
µZ 1
0
P 1¡µit di
¶ 1
1¡µ
; (2)
where Yt is aggregate absorption, Pit denotes the price of good i, and I
K
t and
IHt represent physical and human capital investment per capita, respectively.
Households' expenditures on consumption goods are subject to a cash-in-
advance constraint
Mht ¸ ºhCt; (3)
where Mht denotes real money balances holding by households in period t
and ºh is a parameter.
Households own human capital Ht, and physical capital Kt. Capital
accmulation equations are assumed as follows.
Kt+1 = (1¡ ±K)Kt + IKt ¡
aK
2
µ
IKt
IKt¡1
¡ ´FK
¶2
IKt (4)
Ht+1 = (1¡ ±H)Ht + IHt ¡
aH
2
µ
IHt
IHt¡1
¡ ´FH
¶2
IHt (5)
where ±K and ±H denote the depreciation rates with respect to physical and
human capital, and aK and aH represent the investment adjustment cost
parameters for physical and human capital,3 respectively.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) (henceforth SGU), labor sup-
ply is decided by \a union", which supplies labor monopolistically to a con-
tinuum of labor markets indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. As we shall see below, the
demand for labor in the labor market j is
njt =
µ
Wjt
Wt
¶¡~µ
ndt : (6)
3This type of investment adjustment cost function is assumed in Christiano et al.
(2005) for physical capital investment. We applies this speci¯cation also to human capital
investment because we cannot ¯nd the emperical evidence about the form of human capital
invenstment technology. The study about it remains for future research.
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and nominal wage index is
Wt =
µZ 1
0
W 1¡
~µ
jt dj
¶ 1
1¡~µ
(7)
where ndt is the aggregate labor demand and Wjt denotes the nominal wage
rate in the labor market j. We de¯ne real wage index, wt ´ Wt=Pt, and
real wage rate in labor market j, wjt ´ Wjt=Pt, respectively. The resource
constraint of labor supply is
nt =
Z 1
0
njtdj; (8)
From (7) and (8), a resource constraint which the union faces is obtained as
nt = n
d
t
Z 1
0
µ
wjt
wt
¶¡~µ
dj: (9)
We assume that households can access to a complete set of nominal state-
contingent claims and that the e®ective labor is de¯ned as product of hour
worked and human capital, so that households' intertemporal budget con-
straint is
Etdt;t+1
Xt+1
Pt
+Mht + Ct + I
K
t + (1 + ¿
h)IHt
=
Xt
Pt
+
Pt¡1
Pt
Mht¡1 + (1 + ¿
h)
Z 1
0
Ã
wjt
wt
!¡~µ
ndtHtw
j
tdj + r
K
t Kt + ©t + Tt;
(10)
where dt;s is nominal stochastic discount factor, Xt is nominal payment in
period t, rKt denotes real rental rate on physical capital, ©t is pro¯ts received
from ¯rms, and Tt denotes the transfer from the government. ¿
h represents
human capital investment tax rate and wage subsidy rate to eliminate dis-
tortion which comes from monopolistic competition in labor markets. We
assume ¿h = 1=(~µ ¡ 1).
We assume wage stickiness following Calvo (1983) and SGU, that is, in
each period the union cannot reoptimize the nominal wage in a fraction
»w 2 [0; 1) of randomly chosen labor markets. Following SGU, in these non-
optimized markets, the nominal wages are (fully or partially) indexed to the
nominal good-price in°ation in the previous period.4 Therefore, the nominal
4In some models where labor productivity grows exogenously such as SGU, the nominal
wage rates in the non-reoptimizing labor markets are also indexed to average real wage
growth. In our model, however, average real wage growth is zero because growth of wage
payment comes from human capital accumulation.
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wage setting rule is
Wjt =
(
~Wt if the wage can be re-optimized;
¼ ~Ât¡1Wj;t¡1 otherwise;
where ~Wt is the optimal nominal wage rate in period t, ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1 is
nominal good-price in°ation rate. De¯ning the optimal real wage rate as
~wt ´ ~Wt=Pt, We can rewrite the rule as
wjt =
(
~wt if the wage can be re-optimized;
¼ ~Ât¡1
¼t
wj;t¡1 otherwise:
(11)
Households maximize (2.1) subject to (3), (4), (5), (9), (10), the sticky
wage assumption (11), and the no-Ponzi game condition, choosing processes
for Ct, nt, Xt+1, Mt, I
K
t , I
H
t , Kt+1, Ht+1, and w
j
t . Let us de¯ne the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (3), (4), (5), (9), (10) as ¯t¤t³t, ¯
t¤tq
K
t , ¯
t(1 +
¿h)¤tq
H
t ,
¯t¤twtHt
~¹t
, and ¯t¤t respectively. Restricting our attention to the
strictly-positive nominal interest rate equilibria, we obtain the ¯rst-order
conditions with respect to Ct; nt; Xt+1;Mt; I
K
t ; I
H
t ; Kt+1; Ht+1 as follows.
Ct : ¤t(1 + º
f³t) = (Ct ¡ bCt¡1)¡¾(1¡ nt)Ã(1¡¾) ¡ ¯bEt(Ct+1 ¡ bCt)¡¾(1¡ nt+1)Ã(1¡¾);
(12)
nt :
¤twtHt
~¹t
= Ã(Ct ¡ bCt¡1)1¡¾(1¡ nt)Ã(1¡¾)¡1; (13)
Xt+1 : dt;t+1 =
¯¤t+1
¤t¼t+1
; (14)
Mt : ¤t(1¡ ³t) = ¯Et¤t+1
¼t+1
; (15)
IKt : ¤t = ¤tq
K
t
"
1¡ a
F
K
2
µ
IKt
IKt¡1
¡ ´FK
¶2
¡ aFK
µ
IKt
IKt¡1
¡ ´FK
¶
IKt
IKt¡1
#
+ ¯Et¤t+1q
K
t+1a
F
K
µ
IKt+1
IKt
¡ ´FK
¶µ
IKt+1
IKt
¶2
; (16)
IHt : ¤t = ¤tq
H
t
"
1¡ a
F
H
2
µ
IHt
IHt¡1
¡ ´FH
¶2
¡ aFH
µ
IHt
IHt¡1
¡ ´FH
¶
IHt
IHt¡1
#
+ ¯Et¤t+1q
H
t+1a
F
H
µ
IHt+1
IHt
¡ ´FH
¶µ
IHt+1
IHt
¶2
; (17)
Kt+1 : ¤tq
K
t = ¯Et¤t+1[r
K
t+1 + q
K
t+1(1¡ ±K)]; (18)
Ht+1 : ¤tq
H
t = ¯Et¤t+1[wt+1n
d
t+1 + q
H
t+1(1¡ ±H)]: (19)
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From (14) and the de¯nition of nominal interest rate, 1=Rt = Etdt;t+1, we
obtain the well-known ¯sher relationship,
1
Rt
= ¯Et
¤t+1
¤t¼t+1
: (20)
and, from (15) and (20), the cost of holding money ³t is representing that
³t = 1¡R¡1t : (21)
Next, we consider optimal wage setting behavior. The parts of Lagrangian
that are relevant for wage setting is
Lwt = Et
1X
s=0
(¯»w)
s
h
(1 + ¿h)¤t+sn
d
t+sHt+s ~wt ~Xt;t+s
³ ~wt ~Xt;t+s
wt+s
´¡~µ
¡ ¤t+swt+sHt+s
~¹t+s
ndt+s
³ ~wt ~Xt;t+s
wt+s
´¡~µi
;
where,
~Xt;t+s =
(
1 s = 0;
¼ ~Ât
¼t+1
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¼
~Â
t+s¡1
¼t+s
s = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ :
The ¯rst-order conditions with respect to ~wt is
Et
1X
s=0
(¯»w)
s¤t+sn
d
t+sHt+s
µ
~wt
wt+s
¶¡~µ
~X¡
~µ
t;t+s
"
(1 + ¿h)
~µ ¡ 1
~µ
~wt ~Xt;t+s ¡ wt+s
~¹t+s
#
= 0:
De¯ne F 1t and F
2
t as
F 1t = (1 + ¿
h)
~µ ¡ 1
~µ
~wtEt
1X
s=0
(¯»w)
s¤t+sn
d
t+sHt+s
µ
~wt
wt+s
¶¡~µ
~X1¡
~µ
t;t+s;
F 2t = Et
1X
s=0
(¯»w)
s¤t+sn
d
t+sHt+s
µ
~wt
wt+s
¶¡~µ
~X¡
~µ
t;t+s
wt+s
~¹t+s
;
respectively, and we obtain the recursive formulation of optimal wage setting
behavior,
F 1t = (1 + ¿
h)
~µ ¡ 1
~µ
¤tn
d
tHt
µ
~wt
wt
¶¡~µ
~wt + ¯»wEt
µ
~wt
~wt+1
¶1¡~µÃ
¼ ~Ât
¼t+1
!1¡~µ
F 1t+1;
(22)
F 2t = ¤tn
d
tHt
µ
~wt
wt
¶¡~µ
wt~¹
¡1
t + ¯»wEt
µ
~wt
~wt+1
¶¡~µÃ
¼ ~Ât
¼t+1
!¡~µ
F 2t+1; (23)
F 1t = F
2
t : (24)
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2.2 Firms
Each good i is produced by a single ¯rm indexed by i 2 [0; 1] in monopo-
listically competitive good market. The production technology of Firm i is
represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production function,
Yit = AtK
®
itZ
1¡®
it ;
where At represents exogenous aggregate productivity, Kit and Zit denotes
physical capital and the e®ective labor demanded by ¯rm i, respectively.
We impose a cash-in-advance constraint for wage payments
M fit = º
fwtZit; (25)
where M fit denotes the demand for real money balances by ¯rm i and º
f is
a parameter. The cost of holding money is (1¡R¡1t )M fit, hence the nominal
total production cost of ¯rm i is represented as
rKt Kit + wtZit + (1¡R¡1t )M fit:
The ¯rst-order conditions of the cost minimization problem are given by
rKt = ®AtK
®¡1
it Z
1¡®
it mct; (26)
wt[1 + º
f (1¡R¡1t )] = (1¡ ®)AtK®itZ¡®it mct; (27)µ
Pit
Pt
¶¡µ
Yt = AtK
®
itZ
1¡®
it ; (28)
where mct represents real marginal cost. Note that the real marginal cost is
in common among the ¯rms, hence the subscript representing the ¯rm index
i is dropped.
We assume price stickiness following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), that is,
each period a fraction »p 2 [0; 1) of randomly chosen ¯rms cannot reoptimize
the nominal price of their producted good. Formally, the ¯rms set their
nominal prices according to the following rule,
Pit =
(
~Pt if the ¯rm can set their price optimally,
¼Ât¡1Pi;t¡1 otherwise.
(29)
Hence, pro¯t maximization problem are formulated as
max Et
1X
s=0
dt;t+sPt+s»
s
p
24(1 + ¿Y )ÃXt;t+s ~Pt
Pt+s
!1¡µ
Yt+s ¡
Ã
Xt;t+s ~Pt
Pt+s
!¡µ
Yt+smct+s
35 :
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where,
Xt;t+s =
(
1 s = 0;
¼Ât ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¼Ât+s¡1 s = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;
and where ¿Y = 1=(µ ¡ 1) represents production subsidy rate to eliminate
distortion which comes from monopolistic competition in good markets.
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to ~Pt is
Et
1X
s=0
dt;t+s»
s
pYt+s
24(1 + ¿Y )(µ ¡ 1)X1¡µt;t+s
Ã
~Pt
Pt+s
!¡µ
¡ µX¡µt;t+s
Ã
~Pt
Pt+s
!¡µ¡1
mct+s
35 = 0:
De¯ne X1t and X
2
t as
X1t ´ Et
1X
s=0
dt;t+s»
s
pYt+sX
¡µ
t;t+s
Ã
~Pt
Pt+s
!¡µ¡1
mct+s;
X2t ´ Et
1X
s=0
dt;t+s»
s
pYt+sX
1¡µ
t;t+s
Ã
~Pt
Pt+s
!¡µ
;
respectively, and we obtain the recursive formulation of optimal price setting
behavior,
X1t = ~p
¡µ¡1
t Ytmct + »pEtdt;t+1(¼
Â
t )
¡µ
µ
~pt
¼t+1~pt+1
¶¡µ¡1
X1t+1; (30)
X2t = ~p
¡µ
t Yt + »pEtdt;t+1(¼
Â
t )
1¡µ
µ
~pt
¼t+1~pt+1
¶¡µ
X2t+1; (31)
µX1t = (1 + ¿
Y )(µ ¡ 1)X2t ; (32)
where we de¯ne ~pt ´ ~Pt=Pt.
Finally, we show that labor demand in the market j and nominal wage
index are described as the form of (6) and (7), respectively. The e®ective
labor input of ¯rm i, Zit, is assumed to be a composite e®ective labor made
by the following aggregator
Zit =
·Z 1
0
(Zjit)
~µ¡1
~µ dj
¸ ~µ
~µ¡1
;
where Zjit denotes the e®ective labor demand by ¯rm i in e®ective labor
market j. We also assume that the e®ective labor in the market j is de¯ned
as the product of labor forces in the market j and human capital, which is
9
assumed to be identical across the family menbers. More formally, Zjit ´
njitHt, where n
j
it represents the labor demand by ¯rm i in labor market j.
Hence, the \composite labor" demand by ¯rm i, nit, can be described as
nit =
·Z 1
0
(njit)
~µ¡1
~µ dj
¸ ~µ
~µ¡1
;
and
Zit = nitHt; (33)
that is, the composite e®ective labor input can be written as the product of
the composit labor and human capital.
The cost minimization problem of ¯rm i with respect to labor is
min
Z 1
0
Wjtn
j
itdj
s.t. nit =
·Z 1
0
(njit)
~µ¡1
~µ dj
¸ ~µ
~µ¡1
:
De¯ne the Lagrange multiplier as Wt, which represents nominal wage index
because it is marginal cost of composite labor, and we obtain the following
equations
njit =
µ
Wjt
Wt
¶¡~µ
nit (34)
Wt =
·Z 1
0
(Wjt)
1¡~µdj
¸ 1
1¡~µ
(35)
The equation (35) is identical to the equation (7). By de¯ning aggregate
labor demand in market j and aggregate composite labor demand as
njt ´
Z 1
0
njitdi
and
ndt ´
Z 1
0
nitdi; (36)
respectively. From (34), we obtain the labor demand equation as the form
of (6),
njt =
Z 1
0
njitdi =
Z 1
0
µ
Wjt
Wt
¶¡~µ
nitdi =
µ
Wjt
Wt
¶¡~µ
ndt : (37)
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2.3 Government
Our study focuses only on the monetary policy, hence, for simplicity we
assume that the government does not perchase the ¯nal good and that all
seigniorage is transfered to households. Therefore the intertemporal budget
constraint of the government is
(1 + ¿h)IHt +
µ
Mt ¡ Mt¡1
¼t
¶
= Tt + (1 + ¿
h)wtn
d
tHt + (1 + ¿
Y )Yt;
where Mt denotes aggregate real money supply. In equilibrium, therefore, it
holds that
Mt =M
h
t +M
f
t = º
hCt + º
fwtn
d
tHt; (38)
where M ft ´
R 1
0
M fitdi.
Following some rules described below, monetary authority sets the process
for the nominal interest rate, Rt.
2.4 Aggregation, Market Clearing, and Exogenous pro-
cess
2.4.1 Price and wage indexes
By equations (2) and (29), we obtain
1 = (1¡ »p)~p1¡µt + »p
µ
¼Ât¡1
¼t
¶1¡µ
: (39)
By equations (7) and (11), it holds that
w1¡
~µ
t = (1¡ »w) ~w1¡~µt + »w
Ã
¼ ~Ât¡1
¼t
!1¡~µ
w1¡
~µ
t¡1 : (40)
2.4.2 Final-good markets
Market clearing condition in good market i is written as
AtK
®
itZ
1¡®
it =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶¡µ
Yt: (41)
By equations (33), (36), the resouce constraint with respect to capitalZ 1
0
Kitdi = Kt;
11
and the fact that, in equilibrium, capital to e®ective labor ratios are identical
across the ¯rms because the ¯rm's production function is homogeneous of
degree one, we can integrate the equation (41) over all good markets. As the
result we obtain aggregate resouce constraint
AtK
®
t (n
d
tHt)
1¡® = Ytst; (42)
where we de¯ne
st ´
Z 1
0
µ
Pit
Pt
¶¡µ
di;
or as recursive representation,
st = (1¡ »p)~p¡µt + »p
µ
¼Ât¡1
¼t
¶¡µ
st¡1: (43)
st denotes the ine±ciency by the price dispersion.
By equations (26), (27), and the fact that, the equilibrium capital to
e®ective labor ratios are identical across the ¯rms, we obtain
rKt = ®AtK
®¡1
t (n
d
t )
1¡®H1¡®t mct; (44)
wt[1 + º
f (1¡R¡1t )] = (1¡ ®)AtK®t (ndt )¡®H¡®t mct: (45)
2.4.3 labor markets
By aggregating (37) over all labor markets, we obtain aggregate resouce
constraint with respect to labor,
nt = n
d
t ~st; (46)
where ~st ´
R 1
0
³
wjt
wt
´¡~µ
dj denotes the ine±ciency by the wage dispersion. We
can write the di¯nition as recursive representation,
~st = (1¡ »w)
µ
~wt
wt
¶¡~µ
+ »w
µ
wt¡1
wt
¶¡~µÃ¼ ~Ât¡1
¼t
!¡~µ
~st¡1: (47)
2.4.4 Exogenous process
The law of the motion of aggregate productivity At is assumed to be given
by the following exogenous stochastic process
log
µ
At
¹A
¶
= ½ log
µ
At¡1
¹A
¶
+ ¾²²t; (48)
0 · ½ < 1; ²t » N(0; 1);
where ¾² is standard deviation of the stochastic shock.
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2.5 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
In the environment described above, some of endogenous variables are not
stationary along the balanced-growth path because the economy shows en-
dogenous growth by the same mechanism as Jones et al. (2005b).5 We there-
fore rewrite these variables to be stationary. For this purpose, we categorize
the nonstationary variables into three groups and divide these variables in
each group by the appropriate factors. The ¯rst group are composed of Ct,
Yt, I
K
t , I
H
t , X
1
t , X
2
t , Kt, and Mt, divided by Ht. The second group consists
in F 1t and F
2
t , divided by H
1¡¾
t . A variable in the third group is ¤t, divided
by H¾t . We denote the corresponding stationary variables with lower letters.
Finally, we de¯ne the growth rate of human capital as °Ht ´ Ht=Ht¡1.
We de¯ne a stationary competitive equilibrium as the set of stationary
processes °Ht , ct, ¸t, ³t, nt, ~¹t, ¼t, yt, i
K
t , i
H
t , x
1
t , x
2
t , mct, ~pt, kt, n
d
t , st,
rKt , wt, f
1
t , f
2
t , ~wt, ~st, q
K
t , q
H
t , and mt satisfying the equilibrium conditions
(1), (4), (5), (12), (13), (16)-(21), (22)-(24), (30)-(32), (38)-(40), (42)-(47)
written in terms of the stationary variables, given the nominal interest rate
policy process Rt, exogenous aggregate productivity stochastic process At,
and initial conditions °H0 , c¡1, ¼¡1, i
K
¡1, i
H
¡1, k0, s¡1, w¡1, and ~s¡1.
2.6 Calibration
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The deep parameters are
calibrated by the following way. The time unit is assumed to be one quarter.
We assume cashless economy so that ºh and ºf is zero. ¾ is set to be 1, that
is, we assume that log utility. Given that, we divide the parameters to be
calibrated into three groups. For parameters in the ¯rst group, b, ±K , ±H , ®,
µ, ~µ, »p, »w, Â, ~Â, and ½, we draw on related studies. ½ are set to be 0.95,
which are in the range of the value used in RBC literature. We set b to be
0.69, ±K to be 0.025, ® to be 0.36, ~µ to be 21, »p to be 0.8, and »w to be 0.69,
following Altig et al. (2005). ±H is assumed to be 1¡ (1¡0:025)1=4, following
Jones et al. (2005a). µ is assumed to be 6, such that the steady-state markup
in product good markets is 20 percent. Following SGU and the empirical fact
found by Levin et al. (2005), we set Â and ~Â to be 0 and 1, respectively.
Second, given the values set above, parameters in the second group,
which is composed of Ã, ´, ¹A, are calibrated by using steady-state conditions
and some restrictions. We think zero-in°ation steady-state and assume that
steady-state output growth rate is 0.45 percent per quarter, following SGU.
In the deterministic steady state, we assume labor supply, n, to be one half,6
5See Jones and Manuelli (1990), for more general formulation.
6Given log utility, n = 0:5 implies unit Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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Table 1: Deep Structural Parameters
Parameter Value Description
Endogenous Exogenous
growth growth
¾ 1 1 Preference parameter
¯ 0.99455 0.99455 Subjective discount rate
Ã 2.3776 0.92976 Preference parameter
b 0.69 0.69 Degree of habit persistence
±K 0.025 0.025 Depreciation rate of physical capital
±H 1¡ (1¡ 0:025) 14 |{ Depreciation rate of human capital
aK 0.036527 2.79 Physical capital IAC parameter
aH 0.025380 |{ Human capital IAC parameter
´ 1.0045 1.0045 IAC Parameter
® 0.36 0.36 Cost Share of physical capital
¹A 0.064307 1 Production function parameter
µ 6 6 Price elasticity of good demand
~µ 21 21 Wage elasticity of labor demand
»p 0.8 0.8 Degree of nominal good price rigidities
»w 0.69 0.69 Degree of nominal wage rigidities
Â 0 0 Degree of price indexation
~Â 1 1 Degree of nominal wage indexation
ºh 0 0 Parameter of ¯rm's CIA constraint
ºf 0 0 Parameter of households' CIA constraint
½ 0.95 0.95 Serial correlation of productivity shock
¾² 0.0053317 0.007 Scaling parameter of uncertainty
°H (endogenous) 1.0045 Growth rate of Human capital
quarterly real interest rate, rK , to be one percent, each price of physical and
human capital, qK and qH , to be 1, respectively. Under these assumptions,
we obtain the values of Ã, ´, and ¹A by using steady-state conditions.
Finally, parameters in the third group, aK , aH , and ¾², are calibrated such
that the second moment of key variables in the model match the U.S. business
cycle fact. We set these values such that standard deviation of output growth
rate is 0.84, that standard deviation of physical capital investment growth is
three times larger than that of output growth, and that standard deviation of
broad consumption7 growth is as half as that of output growth under simple
Taylor rule with zero in°ation target, log(Rt= ¹R) = 1:5 log ¼t.
For comparative purpose, we also consider the counterpart exogenous
growth model. In the exogenous growth model, the growth rate of human
capital, °Ht , is exogenously 1.0045 in all t and human capital investment is
zero. aH no longer a®ects the equilibrium. aK is set to be 2.79, following
7Following Jones et al. (2005a), we refer the sum of consumption and human capital
investment as `broad consumption'.
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SGU. ¾² is set to be 0.007, which is standard RBC literature. Given that,
We calibrate the parameters of the exogenous growth model by the same
steady-state restrictions as the endogeous growth model.8
3 Steady State Analysis
3.1 Optimal Long-run In°ation Rate
Given our assumptions of cashless economy, tax on human capital investment,
subsidies on employment and production, no price indexation, and full wage
indexation, we ensure that real allocation of the deterministic steady state
at zero in°ation is the same as steady-state real allocation of social planner
solution. Therefore, the deterministic steady state at zero in°ation is Pareto
optimal.
3.2 Growth and Welfare e®ect of Long-run In°ation
Despite some empirical studies claim the importance of the negative corre-
lation between long-run growth and in°ation, it is underestimated in theo-
ritical literature using nominal frictions such as cash-in-advance constraints.
For example, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) estimated their correlations us-
ing cross-country data and found that a decreasing of in°ation by 2% would
rise the growth rate by 1% per annum, but in theorictical analysis, com-
puted growth e®ect caused by 10% increasing of annual in°ation rate lowers
the annual growth rate by only 0.06% in Gomme (1993) and 0.3% in Jones
and Manuelli (1995). In contrast, the sticky price model has the more sig-
ni¯cantly negative growth and welfare e®ect of in°ation than their °exible
price models. Figure 1 represents the relationship between growth and in-
°ation in the deterministic steady steady state. In our baseline calibration,
a increasing of in°ation from 0% to 10% lowers growth by about 1% per
annum. Moreover, we ¯nd that in our model, welfare cost of in°ation is also
large. a increasing of in°ation by 10% per annum decreases economic welfare
by more than 30% consumption measured at zero-in°ation (Pareto-optimal)
steady state.
Our result obtained above shows that price stickiness brings the signif-
icant growth and welfare e®ect.9 The degree of price stickiness, however,
8The scaling parameter of production function, ¹A, is arbitary in the exogenous model.
Without loss of generality, we set ¹A = 1.
9Wage stickiness does not cause growth and welfare e®ects in steady state of our model
because we assume full nominal wage indexation so that all labor markets is not distorted
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Fig. 1: The e®ects of long-run in°ation
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Table 2: The growth and welfare e®ect of 10% annual in°ation
»p 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 (baseline)
Growth e®ect -0.007 -0.0257 -0.102 -1.03
Welfare cost 0.255 0.983 3.92 35.5
Note: i) Growth rate is described in net growth per year. ii) Welfare cost is measured by
percentage of consumption in zero-in°ation steady state.
would be highly di®erence across countries. We then do a sensitivity analy-
sis for the degree of price stickiness, »p. Table 2 represents growth and welfare
e®ect of 10% annual in°ation when »p = 0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8. The result shows
that the low degree of price stickiness lower the growth e®ect of in°ation.
Note that growth and welfare e®ect is nonlinear in our model. The higher
in°ation is, the more marginal growth decreasing is. This nonlinearity is not
consistent with recent empirical evidence. We conjecture that our nonlinear-
ity result is caused by the time-dependent sticky price assumption. In the
assumption, high in°ation bring severe distortion of price stickiness. If the
assumption of sticky price was state-dependent pricing such as Dotsey et al.
(1999), high in°ation would lower the degree of price stickiness and might be
consistent with empirical studies.
4 Equilibrium Dynamics
4.1 Solution Method
Because of the complexity of the model, an exact numerical solution does
not exist. The log-linearization method, however, eliminates the growth
e®ects which comes from uncertainty because unconditional means of en-
dogenous variables are identical to the values at deterministic steady state
in log-linearized model. We then approximate the equilibrium conditions
and the conditional welfare measure to second-order accuracy by using the
computation method developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
4.2 Monetary Policy Rules
We consider the equilibrium dynamics and welfares under simple Taylor rule
and optimal operational monetary policy rules below. In this subsection, we
present the de¯nitions of Taylor rules.
in steady state with any in°ation rate.
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The Simple Taylor Rule First, as a benchmark, we apply the simple
Taylor rule responding only to in°ation,
log
µ
Rt
R¤
¶
= 1:5 log
³ ¼t
¼¤
´
; (49)
where variables with asterisks denote their values at the zero-in°ation deter-
ministic steady state.
The Taylor Rule In order to investigate the e®ect of growth by respond-
ing to output, we use the standard Taylor rule also responding to cyclical
components of output,
log
µ
Rt
R¤
¶
= 1:5 log
³ ¼t
¼¤
´
+ 0:5 log
µ
yt
y¤
¶
: (50)
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Growth e®ects of Monetary Policy
Our numerical result under the simple and standard Taylor rules are repre-
sented in Table 3. According to this, under baseline parameters the simple
Taylor rule lowers the long-run growth rate by 3 £ 10¡3 percent per year.
Furthermore, the rule responding to output has more signi¯cantly negative
growth e®ect. the rule lowers the long-run growth rate by 7£ 10¡2 percent
per year. It is seen to be small for policy implication but we think it as
not to be negligible for the literature of the relationship between growth and
°uctuations. For example, Jones et al. (2005b) show that the convex mod-
els of endogenous growth without nominal rigidities has positive or negative
growth e®ect of uncertainty. Under reasonable parameter values, the growth
e®ects of uncertainty in their model increase long-run growth rate by at most
7 £ 10¡2 percent per year. Hence, the growth e®ects of monetary policy at
least o®set their growth e®ect when the economies have nominal rigidities.
Jones et al. (2005b) claim that the di®erences of long-run growth across
countries may be able to contribute to sharper estimations of deep param-
eters such as intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Our result, however,
suggests that given the existence of nominal rigidities and the di®erences
of policy rules across countries, we can not ignore the growth e®ect of the
di®erences of monetary policy rules to estimate those ones.
4.3.2 Relationship between In°ation Volatility and Growth
Dotsey and Sarte (2000) show that ¯nancial imperfection cause the positive
relationship between in°ation volatility and growth. Empirical evidences,
18
Fig. 2: The in°ation volatility e®ects on long-run growth
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
αpi
α
pi
W
o
b
o:welfare,+:E(γY ),x:σ(pi), Welfare
αpi
α
pi
W
o
b
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
E(γY )
αpi
α
pi
W
o
b
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
σ(pi)
αpi
α
pi
W
o
b
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
σ(piW
ob
)
αpi
α
pi
W
o
b
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
σ(R)
αpi
α
pi
W
o
b
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
19
Table 3: The Taylor Rules
Simple Taylor Rule: log(Rt=R¤) = 1:5 log(¼t=¼¤)
Taylor Rule - Output: log(Rt=R¤) = 1:5 log(¼t=¼¤) + 0:5 log(yt=y¤)
Welfare Cost ¾¼ ¾¼Wob ¾R E(°^
Y )
A: Endogenous Growth New Keynesian Model
Baseline
Simple Taylor Rule 0.073 0.38 1.12 0.57 ¡2:61£ 10¡3
Taylor Rule - Output 4.005 5.56 5.52 5.32 ¡7:74£ 10¡2
High IACs (aK = aH = 10)
Simple Taylor Rule 0.058 0.86 0.58 1.29 ¡2:81£ 10¡3
Taylor Rule - Output 4.300 5.77 5.77 6.12 ¡8:41£ 10¡2
B: Standard New Keynesian Model
Baseline
Simple Taylor Rule 0.011 0.79 0.64 1.19 |
Taylor Rule - Output 3.189 7.99 8.01 8.30 |
High IAC (aK = 10)
Simple Taylor Rule 0.029 1.09 0.73 1.63 |
Taylor Rule - Output 3.042 7.83 7.87 8.29 |
Note: i) For de¯nition of welfare cost, see appendix. ii) ¾x represents the standard
deviation of x. ¾¼, ¾R denote on annual rates. iii) E(c^) represents unconditional mean of
percentage deviation of c from deterministic steady state. E(°^Y ) denotes unconditional
mean of percentage deviation of °Y from deterministic steady state on annual rate.
however, implies unclear correlations across countries. In our model, their
relationship depends on the monetary policy rules. We here consider the
following rule,
log
µ
Rt
R¤
¶
= ®¼ log
³ ¼t
¼¤
´
+ ®¼
Wob
log
Ã
¼W
ob
t
¼W ob¤
!
; (51)
where we de¯ne the observable nominal wage in°ation, ¼W
ob
t , as
¼W
ob
t ´
WtHt
Wt¡1Ht¡1
= ¼t°
H
t
wt
wt¡1
:
Figure 2 shows that the relationship between policy coe±cients which
govern response to price- and wage-in°ation and the moments of relavant
endogenous variables. When ®¼
Wob
is high, long-run growth has negative
relationship to in°ation volatility. However, When ®¼
Wob
is relatively low,
the two has positive relationship because then the higher ®¼ is, the smaller
¾(¼) is but the greater volatility of wage in°ation ¾(¼W
ob
) is. Therefore,
the existence of wage stickiness cause either positive or negative relationship
between in°ation volatility and growth.
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Table 4: Optimal Operational Monetary Policy Rules
Policy Coe±cients ¾¼ ¾¼Wob ¾R E(°^
Y )
®¼ ®°
Y
®¼
Wob
®R
A: Endogenous Growth New Keynesian Model
Baseline 1.70 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.28 0.42 0.27 1:7£ 10¡4
High IACs
aK = aH = 10 6.52 0.00 6.28 0.00 0.41 0.34 1.30 ¡1:1£ 10¡3
B: Standard New Keynesian Model
Baseline 2.70 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.52 0.57 1.39 |
High IACs
aK = 10 3.68 0.00 2.31 0.00 0.59 0.52 1.41 |
Note: i) For de¯nition of policy rule, see equation (52). ii) ¾x represents the standard
deviation of x. ¾¼, ¾R denote on annual rates. iii) E(c^) represents unconditional mean of
percentage deviation of c from deterministic steady state. E(°^Y ) denotes unconditional
mean of percentage deviation of °Y from deterministic steady state on annual rate.
5 Optimal Operational Monetary Policy Rules
5.1 De¯nition
The operational monetary policy rules are de¯ned as the rules satisfying
the following four operational conditions similar to SGU. First, monetary
orthority must set nominal interest rate according to the following interest
rate feedback rules,
log
µ
Rt
R¤
¶
= ®¼ log
³ ¼t
¼¤
´
+®°
Y
log
µ
°Yt
°Y ¤
¶
+®¼
Wob
log
Ã
¼W
ob
t
¼W ob¤
!
+®R log
µ
Rt¡1
R¤
¶
;
(52)
Second, coe±cients of the interest rate rules, ®¼, ®°
Y
, ®¼
Wob
, and ®R,
must be in the ranges of [0; 10]. Third, The equilibrium must be uniquely
determined, that is, equilibrium under operational policy must not have °uc-
tuation driven by agents' expectations. Fourth, The standard deviation of
nominal rate of interest must be less than a half of steady state value of
nominal interest rate, that is, 2¾R < logR
¤, that is, the possibilities that
nominal interest rate hits its zero-lower bound must be kept to be low.
In this section, we consider optimal operational monetary policy rules of
our model. Assume that the economy is in the deterministic steady state at
the beginning of period 0. The optimal policy (®¼ ®°
Y
®¼
Wob
®R) maximizes
the welfare measure conditional on the deterministic steady state, vt, de¯ned
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as
vt =
¯
1¡ ¯ log °
H
t+1 + log(ct ¡ bct¡1=°Ht ) + Ã log(1¡ nt) + ¯Etvt+1; (53)
subject to the operational conditions de¯ned above. This conditional wel-
fare measure is derived from the utility function of representative household.
The details are in appendix. We analyze the optimal policy under baseline
structural parameter values.
Moreover, we compute the optimal policy under the high investment ad-
justment cost case, aK = aH = 10. The reasons is as follows. First, we
calibrate the parameters which govern the degrees of investment adjustment
cost to match the ratio of volatility of physical capital investment and the
ratio of volatility of broad consumption to the volatility of output. However,
we have not empirical evidence enough to estimate the degrees of investment
adjustment cost sharply, especially human capital investment adjustment
cost. Hence, we would have to do sensitivity analysis about their parame-
ter. Second, more importantly, investment adjustment costs theirselves have
the growth e®ect of investment volatility. Barlevy (2004b) shows that in
the endogenous growth models with concave capital production technolo-
gies, equivalently convex investment adjustment costs, investment volatili-
ties lower long-run growth even if unconditional means of investment levels
unchange. Therefore, if the model has a negative relationship between price-
or wage-stabilization and investment stabilization, Optimal policy rules may
respond to output when Barlevy's e®ect is strong. The socond reason is that
we would like to investigate whether optimal monetary policy is changed by
Barlevy's e®ect.
5.2 Results
Our numerical results are shown in Table 4. Under the baseline calibration,
the response of optimal monetary policy rules to price and wage in°ation
are positive, and the one to output growth is mute. This result is simi-
lar to the exogenous growth model with sticky price and wage. SGU and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) show that optimal operational monetary
policy should respond to in°ation and should not respond to output or out-
put growth. The reason is that the larger policy coe®cient with respect to
output growth, ®°
Y
, is, the greater volatility of in°ation is so that the distor-
tion of price dispersion becomes higher. We see the fact that this intuition
is right by the analogy to Table 3.
Our second ¯nding is that optimal monetary policy virtually does not
depends on the degree of investment adjustment cost. Even if the degree of
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Table 5: Growth-Maximizing Monetary Policy Rules
Policy Coe±cients Welfare ¾¼ ¾¼Wob ¾R E(°^
Y )
®¼ ®°
Y
®¼
Wob
®R Cost
(100£ ¤c)
Baseline 1.37 0.00 0.83 0.00 4:4£ 10¡4 0.25 0.46 0.26 1:9£ 10¡4
High IACs
aK = aH = 10 5.27 0.00 4.88 0.00 8:4£ 10¡5 0.43 0.33 1.27 ¡1:1£ 10¡3
Note: i) For de¯nition of policy rule, see equation (52). ii) ¾x represents the standard
deviation of x. ¾¼, ¾R denote on annual rates. iii) E(c^) represents unconditional mean of
percentage deviation of c from deterministic steady state. E(°^Y ) denotes unconditional
mean of percentage deviation of °Y from deterministic steady state on annual rate.
adjustment costs are extremely high, aK = aH = 10, the features of optimal
policy regime that monetary authority should respond to price- and wage-
in°ation and not to real activity does not change.
These two ¯ndings suggest that growth e®ect itself have only weak trade-
o® between price- and wage- in°ation stabilization descrived in the previ-
ous subsection because optimal policy rules feature only price- and wage-
stabilization. In order to ensure that growth e®ect of investment adjustment
costs, we do an exercise seeking operational monetary policy rules maximize
the unconditional mean of output growth. The result represents in Table.
5. We ¯nd that the growth-maximizing policy rule responds only to price-
and wage-in°ation and not to output growth and this rule atteins virtually
identical long-run output growth rate to that of optimal policy rule. This re-
sult suggests that our conclusion that Barlevy's e®ect has not strong tradeo®
between nominal and investment stabilization would be right.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the e®ects of monetary policy in an endogenous growth
model. In this paper, we obtain some positive and normative implications
about in°ation and growth. First, in steady state, sticky price distortion have
the negative growth and welfare e®ect and this e®ect is highly sensitive to the
degree of price stickiness. This sensitivity may account for the di®erence of
growth rate across countries. Of cource, price stickiness would change along
the economic environment and time so that we need further theoretical and
empirical studies about price stickiness.
Second, in stochastic environment, the long-run rate of output growth is
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a®ected by the monetary stabilization policy rules. Especially, policy rule
responds to output lower the long-run growth rate strongly. The empirical
study by Orphanides (2003) suggests the possiblities that output response
of monetary policy in the Great In°ation period brings stag°ation. Our
numerical result is consistent with his ¯ndings. The simulation analysis using
our model about the periods would be useful to understand the mechanism
of stag°ation.
Third, The e®ect of volatility of in°ation on long-run growth is not clear.
This result is consistent with empirical evidence. The source of unclearness in
our model is the existence of wage stickiness. Our conclusion should be tested
by an empirical exercise about the relationship between in°ation volatility
and growth, in addition to wage volatility.
Fourth, in spite of above various results that growth and nominal vari-
ables, the features of the optimal operational policy is not turned from exoge-
nous growth New Keynesian models. Our numerical exercises demonstrate
that resolution of price- and wage- tradeo® virtually maximize the long-
run growth. This result implies that the tradeo® between stabilization and
growth does not exist or is weak. This conclusion is also very similar to Black-
burn and Pelloni (2005). They show that in an endogenous growth model
with sticky wage, growth-maximizing policy is optimal. Our result implies
that growth is important from positive perspective but monetary authorities
do not need to consider growth in practice.
Finally, note that because of complexity of the model, we do not ¯nd
accurate mechanism of growth e®ect. Even in the two-capital convex model
of endogenous growth without nominal rigidities developed by Jones et al.
(2005b), they does not ¯nd exact mechanism about growth e®ect of un-
certainty. We should analyze the mechanism of growth e®ect of nominal
rigidities more analytically, even in simpler model such as AK model with
single nominal rigidity.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Conditions
Equilibrium conditions
¤t[1 + ºh(1¡R¡1t )] = (Ct ¡ bCt¡1)¡¾(1¡ nt)Ã(1¡¾) ¡ ¯bEt(Ct+1 ¡ bCt)¡¾(1¡ nt+1)Ã(1¡¾)
1
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= ¯Et
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Equilibrium conditions written by stationary variables
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Appendix B: Welfare Cost Measure
CRRA case
Vt ´ Et
1X
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Dividing it by H1¡¾t and de¯ning vt =
Vt
H1¡¾t
, we rewrite the welfare function
as the recursive formulation by the stationary variables:
vt =
(ct ¡ bct¡1=°Ht )1¡¾(1¡ nt)Ã(1¡¾)
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H
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log case (¾ = 1)
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¸
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De¯ning vt as:
vt ´ Vt ¡ 1
1¡ ¯ logHt;
we obtain the recursive formulation:
vt =
¯
1¡ ¯ log °
H
t+1 + log(ct ¡ bct¡1=°Ht ) + Ã log(1¡ nt) + ¯Etvt+1:
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